Apr30 |
A Study in Incompetence (and a cause for hope, too) |
After the poor performance of the Israel Defence Force in Lebanon last summer, the government appointed a committee to report on the conduct of the war. Part of the committee’s work has just been released. Whoever expected former judge Eliyahu Winograd, who was tasked with heading the committee, to be soft on those who appointed him, turned out to be mistaken. The report’s main findings read like a study in government incompetence:
a. The decision to respond with an immediate, intensive military strike was not based on a detailed, comprehensive and authorized military plan, based on careful study of the complex characteristics of the Lebanon arena. [...]
b. Consequently, in making the decision to go to war, the government did not consider the whole range of options [...] This failure reflects weakness in strategic thinking, which derives the response to the event from a more comprehensive and encompassing picture.
[...]
11. The primary responsibility for these serious failings rests with the Prime Minister, the minister of defense and the (outgoing) Chief of Staff. [...]
As to Prime Minister Olmert’s (of Kadima, and formerly a member of Likud) part in the war:
b. The Prime Minister made up his mind hastily, despite the fact that no detailed military plan was submitted to him and without asking for one. Also, his decision was made without close study of the complex features of the Lebanon front and of the military, political and diplomatic options available to Israel. He made his decision without systematic consultation with others, especially outside the IDF, despite not having experience in external-political and military affairs. [...]
e. All of these add up to a serious failure in exercising judgment, responsibility and prudence.
Defence Minister Peretz of the Socialist Party, a former labour union leader, fares even worse:
13. [...]
a. The Minister of Defense did not have knowledge or experience in military, political or governmental matters. He also did not have good knowledge of the basic principles of using military force to achieve political goals.b. Despite these serious gaps, he made his decisions during this period without systemic consultations with experienced political and professional experts [...].
c. The Minister of Defense did not act within a strategic conception of the systems he oversaw. He did not ask for the IDF’s operational plans and did not examine them; he did not check the preparedness and fitness of IDF; and did not examine the fit between the goals set and the modes of action presented and authorized for achieving them. His influence on the decisions made was mainly pointillist and operational. [...]
d. The Minister of Defense did not develop an independent assessment of the implications of the complexity of the front for Israel’s proper response, the goals of the campaign, and the relations between military and diplomatic moves within it. His lack of experience and knowledge prevented him from challenging in a competent way both the IDF, over which he was in charge, and the Prime Minister.
e. [...] Therefore, his serving as Minister of Defense during the war impaired Israel’s ability to respond well to its challenges.
The only good thing to come out of the Lebanon War is this extensive scrutiny that Israel’s defence posture is now being subjected to. While the tortutous Israeli soul-searching after the campaign lost the country some points on the public relations front (as Nasrallah’s men spuriously declared victory), the current development is demonstrating the democratic capacity for self-criticism that will always give the country an edge over its despotic neighbours. Public scrutiny will spur the defence establisment to draw the right lessons from the inconclusive campaign in Lebanon, ensuring that the small country can hold its own in the future.





